Recent empirics suggest the relevance of transport cost reductions for world trade growth along with eliminations in protectionist trade barriers. To address the welfare effects of trade cost reductions in a context of 'trade and the environment,' we develop a two-stage game model where governments choose environmental and trade policies and firms play a Cournot-Nash game. We show that reductions in transport costs lead to lower emission taxes and higher tariffs. And, we find that the degree of pollution damage plays a central role in whether market integration is welfare-improving relative to autarky.
Introduction
Over the last decades, multilateral market integration has led to rapid growth in world trade. While it is obvious that such growth in world trade has improved welfare of each country and the world, it simultaneously brings new concerns, e.g., protection of intellectual property rights, and trade and labor standard. Among others, 'trade and the environment' has received much attention in both international and environmental economics, which has brought a large literature.
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One of the central interests in this field is what consequences follow from a noncooperative setting of environmental policies. Early contributions include Conrad (1993) , Kennedy (1994a,b) , Rauscher (1994) , Ulph (1996) and Tanguay (2001) , wherein each country is motivated to use laxer environmental policies as a tacit protectionist trade policy called 'ecodumping. ' In contrast, a Bertrand-Nash model of Barrett (1994, Section 5) shows that the noncooperatively determined environmental policy is tougher than the environmentally optimal level. Based on the above body of literature, Walz and Wellisch (1997) , Burguet Despite these evidences, to our knowledge, there is no study except for Straume (2006) that addresses the effects of transport cost reductions. 5 Straume (2006) examines the effects of transport cost reductions in a two-stage game model in which governments choose emission taxes and then oligopolistic firms choose output and abatement levels, taking the taxes as given. One of his novel results is that market integration can reduce the need for inter-country policy coordination.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a two-country, two-stage game model to consider the impact of market integration, i.e., transport cost reductions, on the optimal tariff and emission tax, and welfare. While we are partly common with Straume (2006) in interests, this paper is greatly differentiated. First, we allow for not only emission taxes but also tariffs as policy instruments. 6 Second, we pay much attention to welfare effects of market integration whereas Straume's (2006) aim is to analyze policy coordination.
We establish two main results. First, market integration leads each country to impose a laxer environmental policy (lower emission tax) and a tougher trade policy (higher tariff). Second, we find three patterns of the dependence of the Nash equilibrium welfare on trade costs. Whether freer trade is beneficial highly depends on the degree of pollution damage.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates a two-stage game model in which the government in two trading countries noncooperatively chooses emission taxes and tariffs in the first stage and firms play a Cournot-Nash game in the second stage. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is characterized. Section 3 explores welfare effects of transport cost reductions. Section 4 concludes the paper.
A Model

FUNDAMENTALS
Consider a reciprocal market model of intra-industry trade in homogeneous goods.
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There are two symmetric countries (Home and Foreign), two goods (Goods 1 and 2) and one factor (labor). The Foreign variables are asterisked to distinguish them from the Home variables. The market of Good 1 in each country is segmented and duopolized by a Home firm (firm X) and a Foreign firm (firm Y). Without loss of generality, one unit of labor produces one unit of Good 2, which is the numareire, so that the wage rate is internationally fixed to unity. Production of Good 1 is nationally monopolized under a constant marginal cost c ≥ 0, and emits a proportional emission, which is transboundary. Letting x (resp. y) and x * (resp. y * ) be the Home (resp. Assume a representative consumer in each country whose preference is
where u is utility, C i , i = 1, 2 is the consumption of Goods 1 and 2, and s is marginal damage from pollution. 
where the first term in these equations represents the profit from serving in the Home market and the second term is the counterpart in the Foreign market.
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Let us consider the following two-stage game. The Home and Foreign governments choose emission taxes and tariffs to maximize welfare in the first stage. Taking these policy choices as given, the Home and Foreign firms play a Cournot-Nash game in the second stage. We will solve this game with backward induction.
A COURNOT-NASH GAME
This subsection solves the second stage of the game: a quantity-setting game.
Solving the system of the first-order conditions for profit maximization yields the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs:
Making use of (4)- (7), consumer surplus in Home denoted by CS (resp. ) and the tariff revenue ty to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion, Home's welfare to be maximized in the first stage is defined as follows.
Foreign denoted by CS
Applying the same procedure to Foreign, the Foreign government's payoff is
, t, T ) due to the symmetry assumption between countries.
A POLICY GAME
Having derived the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the second stage, let us turn to the first stage and derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Each government seeks to maximize welfare by choosing emission taxes and tariffs. Then, the first-order conditions are
These conditions allow us to find that both governments choose the same level of emission taxes and tariffs, each of which is explicitly derived as
where superscript N refers to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Substituting these into (4)- (7) and using the definition of pollution, the domestic emission (the total supply of a firm) and the pollution level in each country
Thus, the degree of transboundary pollution θ has no impact on the individual firm's emission and a positive impact on pollution in each country.
Eqs. (9) and (10) Table 1 in detail, the effect of a change in transport costs on consumer utility is U τ T = U tT = −1/9.
These negative signs imply that transport cost reductions increase each country's marginal benefit from taxation and thus higher taxes are chosen. The reason is simply that reduced transport costs promote competition and thus the distortion associated with under-supply becomes weaker, namely, there is less need to under-tax to tackle the under-supply problem.
The second welfare component is considered by examining the effect on net trade surplus, S τ and S t . Appendix shows that S τ T > 0 and S tT < 0, which, in turn, implies that market integration strengthens (resp. weakens) the rent-shifting motive through an emission tax (resp. a tariff). As Straume (2006, p. 544) states, 'lower trade costs make it easier to capture rents from the foreign market.' Therefore, each government chooses a lower emission tax and a higher tariff so as to shift more rents from the trading country.
The third and fourth components relate to the effects on production costs and damages from pollution. As is inferred from the linear specification of production cost and pollution damage, there is no effect of transport cost reductions on these terms, i.e., The total effect of reduced transport costs on the equilibrium emission tax and tariff is determined by the above effects. If transport cost reductions favorably affect the change in marginal benefit from emission taxes and tariffs, governments will raise these taxes. As Table 1 summarizes, since the positive effect on net trade surplus outweighs the negative effect on consumer utility, the total effect becomes positive and hence market integration induces a higher emission tax. In contrast, both the effect on consumer utility and net trade surplus are negative in the case of tariffs. Consequently, the total effect also becomes negative and a lower tariff is induced by market integration. 
Gains/Losses from Trade
This section considers the relationship between the welfare level determined in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and transport costs. To this end, we need to compute a prohibitive trade cost over which exports are zero and the resulting equilibrium coincides with the autarkic equilibrium. Substituting (9) and (10) into either (5) or (6), each firm's export becomes
Thus, setting this to zero, the prohibitive transport cost T is
From an economic point of view, this must be non-negative and thus we need a restriction that s ≤ 5(a − c)/(5 + 8θ).
Let us next compute the welfare level in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Substituting (9) and (10) into (8) and rearranging terms yield
The rest of our task is to closely examine the properties of W (T ). Our finding is summarized in: 
(Figures 1-4 around here)
Proof: We begin by comparing the welfare levels at zero transport cost and the prohibitive transport cost. Evaluating (12) at T = 0 and T = T , welfare in these two polar cases is respectively
Taking the ratio between these two, we have
, which exceeds one if and only if s < 9(a−c)/(9+32θ). That is, if the damage from pollution is small enough, welfare at zero transport cost is higher than that at the prohibitive transport cost, i.e., welfare under autarky.
The next task is to compute the slope of W (T ). Differentiating (12) once and twice yields Therefore, the three thresholds that determine three inequalities in Proposition 2 have a unique ranking such that
This ranking is depicted in Figure 4 . Based on it, we can divide three possi- i.e., promotes competition, and thus favorably affects welfare (procompetitive effect). In contrast, increased imports associated with reductions in transport costs can have a negative welfare effect since the less efficient foreign firm's market share expands in each country.
16
In addition to these effects, transport cost reductions unambiguously expand both domestic and global pollution.
The overall welfare effect is determined by the interplay among these three effects. If s is small enough, the pollution expansion effect is negligible and the result in trade theory is reestablished; welfare depends on T in a U-shaped and T = 0 ensures higher welfare than autarky (Figure 1 ). This is because survives our model even though we allow for pollution damages as long as s is too small.
In contrast, the larger s is, the more significant the pollution expansion effect is. This is illustrated in Case 2: autarky yields higher welfare than Proof: Under θ = 0, we have
which immediately leads to the result. Q.E.D. 
